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Abstract 
 
Following the financial crisis, the UK central bank gained important new prudential powers for 
upholding financial stability. Yet the reforms diverged significantly from the government’s 
original plans and arguably produced a suboptimal institutional design. Drawing on theories of 
blame avoidance, we argue that the changes were motivated primarily by the need to manage 
reputational risk. Prior to the 2010 election, the two main parties tried to deflect blame for the 
crisis by putting forward competing proposals for agency reconfiguration. In response, the 
Bank of England pursued a strategy of agency subversion aimed at reshaping the reforms to 
minimise future reputational damage. This involved pushing for ‘hard’ delegation to maximise 
control of new macroprudential powers, while using ‘fuzzy’ delegation to shift microprudential 
supervision down to subordinate agencies. The article sheds new light on the drivers of post-
crisis reform and the importance and limits of delegation as a strategy of blame avoidance. 
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Introduction 
 
Since the financial crisis, far-reaching institutional reforms have been introduced in the UK 
aimed at strengthening the stability of the banking system. This has led to the central bank 
being granted important new macro- and micro-prudential powers to uphold financial stability. 
Given the scale and depth of the banking crisis in the UK, there was broad agreement across 
the political spectrum that fundamental reform was needed. Yet the reforms proved surprisingly 
contentious, diverging significantly from the government’s original plans and arguably 
producing a suboptimal institutional design. How can we explain this? 
 
The crisis has generated important new research on national central banks (Klompa and de 
Haana 2009; Masciandaro 2009, 2012; Cukierman 2013; McPhilemy 2013; Reichlin and 
Baldwin 2013; Bell and Hindmoor 2015, 2016; Goodhart 2015; Howarth and Quaglia 2016). 
Functionalist accounts focus on how and why delegated powers have been reconfigured by the 
financial crisis. Critics have argued that the narrow monetary policy mandate granted to central 
banks prior to the crisis contributed to the accumulation of unsustainable financial risk (for an 
overview, see Galati and Moessner 2011). In response, new macroprudential regulatory tools 
and enhanced microprudential supervisory responsibilities have therefore been delegated by 
governments to independent central banks (Eijffinger and Masciandaro 2011). 
 
Ideational accounts of post-crisis reform draw on processes of policy learning and diffusion. In 
an important contribution, Baker (2013a, 2013b, 2015) highlights the role of ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’ in promoting a macroprudential ideational shift since the financial crisis. From 
this perspective, macroprudential regulation originated amongst transnational networks of 
financial technocrats and regulators, producing a common interpretive frame for understanding 
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the crisis and advancing institutional blueprints for regulatory reform at the national level (see 
also McPhilemy 2016). These explanations are valuable because they help to explain cross-
national similarities in institutional reform. Yet they work best when applied to third-order 
change; that is, the ideas, assumptions and discourse that informs or sets the overarching 
objectives of policy in a given area (Hall 1993). But they are arguably less useful at explaining 
second- or first-order change; the institutional arrangements and instruments used to achieve 
those objectives. In particular, ideational perspectives on their own are unable to account for 
persistent or increasing national differences in central bank reform since the crisis. 
 
With respect to macroprudential regulation, the terms on which new countercyclical policy 
tools have been delegated, and the extent to which they are subject to political control, differs 
markedly. A clear divide exists between those countries where macroprudential oversight 
committees are chaired by a member of the government (as in the US) or by the head of the 
central bank (the Eurozone) (Goodhart 2015). Similarly, there is no consensus regarding the 
precise location of microprudential supervision. Although many large economies have moved 
towards the ‘twin peaks’ regime which locates prudential supervision and conduct regulation 
in separate authorities, the single authority model combining both functions remains dominant 
across much of Europe (ECB 2010).1 Important differences also persist over whether 
supervision of large financial institutions is fully integrated into the central bank or is housed 
in a separate subsidiary or independent agency. This continued variation points to the relevance 
of national-level variables in mediating shared pressures for reform. 
 
This article seeks to complement existing functional and ideational perspectives on central 
bank reform (Goodhart 2015). Using the UK as a case study, our central claim is that the post-
crisis reforms are the outcome of a process of political and bureaucratic contestation. Drawing 
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on theories of blame avoidance, we argue that the changes were shaped in large part by a 
concern for managing reputational risk. This comes from two main observations. First, in the 
run up to the 2010 general election, the two main parties tried to deflect blame for the crisis by 
pursuing agency reconfiguration. In particular, the Conservative opposition sought to attribute 
blame to the incumbent Labour government by pledging to scrap the Financial Services 
Authority and transfer new prudential powers to the Bank of England. Second, following the 
formation of a new Coalition Government in May 2010, the Bank pursued a strategy of agency 
subversion aimed at reshaping the changes to minimise future reputational damage. It did so in 
two ways. Where blame for future policy failure could potentially be deflected, it used fuzzy 
delegation to shift new policy responsibilities down to subordinate agencies (e.g. 
microprudential supervision). By contrast, where blame could not ultimately be avoided, it 
fought for hard delegation to maximise control over new regulatory powers (e.g. 
macroprudential regulation). We argue that this resulted in an institutional design which not 
only diverged significantly from the government’s original plans, but which was also arguably 
sub-optimal. Our research is based on twenty-six anonymous interviews conducted between 
2013 and 2015 with senior officials from the Bank of England, HM Treasury, 10 Downing 
Street, the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), as 
well as financial practitioners in the City of London, who were directly involved in the reform 
process.  
 
The following section provides an overview of existing functionalist explanations of central 
bank powers, before outlining the added value of our blame avoidance approach. The next 
section analyses how elected officials sought to deflect blame by putting forward competing 
reform proposals. The main section then examines how the Bank of England responded in an 
effort to protect its reputation. The conclusion reflects on how the article sheds new light on 
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the drivers of post-crisis reform and the importance and limits of delegation as a strategy blame 
avoidance. 
 
Functionalist explanations of central bank reform 
 
Functionalist accounts draw on principal-agent analysis to explain why governments delegate 
power to autonomous regulatory agencies, like central banks (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; 
Miller and Whitford, 2016). First, agencies provide credible commitments to desirable policy 
outcomes. By removing direct control from elected politicians, there is less scope to manipulate 
policy instruments for electoral reasons. Second, delegation can enhance the efficiency of 
decision-making by facilitating the development of technical knowledge and expertise in 
complex regulatory fields. Finally, agencies can be used for blame shifting, allowing policy 
makers to delegate responsibility for unpopular or contested decisions. Principal-agent analysis 
also tells us that delegation comes at a price in the form of agency loss. This occurs when the 
preferences of the principal and agent diverge, either because the agent pursues its own 
preferences (agency ‘slippage’) or because institutional incentives cause the agency to behave 
contrary to the preferences of the principal (agency ‘shirking’) (McCubbins and Schwartz 
1984). To limit agency losses, principals can impose restrictions on agency autonomy in 
advance (ex ante controls) or by monitoring agency behaviour (ex post controls). 
 
Pollack (2002) suggests that if the policy preferences of the principal are clear and relatively 
fixed, then delegation is primarily motivated by the need to reduce commitment problems. In 
this context, delegation will tend to be high and ex ante controls will be low to maximise the 
credibility of agent decisions. This is the case in the field of monetary policy where policy 
objectives are frequently defined in the form of quantitative inflation targets. Hence the trend 
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over recent decades for delegating control of interest rates to independent central banks as a 
means to enable governments to signal their pre-commitment to maintaining low inflation 
(Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991; Goodman 1992; Cukierman 1998, 2008; Gilardi 
2007). 
 
Applying this logic to prudential policy making is more contestable, however (Fernández-
Albertos, 2015). On the one hand, Haldane (2013) argues that the case for delegation to 
operationally-independent regulators is as strong, and arguably stronger, for financial stability 
policy. This is because time inconsistency problems are even more acute: evidence suggests 
that financial cycles, compared to business cycles, are longer in duration, exhibit wider 
fluctuations, impose larger costs, and generate stronger constituencies of winners and losers 
(see Claessens et al. 2008). On the other hand, macroprudential policy objectives tend to be 
less quantifiable and more fluid than fixed monetary policy targets. This is because the 
countercyclical nature of prudential policy is time dependent, meaning that regulatory 
objectives must evolve with the rhythms of economic cycles (Baker 2013b: 419). 
Consequently, policy making is likely to be characterised by a high level of experimentation 
and learning for some time (Baker 2013b). Prudential policy making also involves making 
complex policy trade-offs with politically-sensitive and/or unknowable distributional 
implications which elected officials will be reluctant to ‘lock in’. In this context, we would 
expect delegation of prudential powers to be driven less by the need to make fixed credible 
commitments, and more by other functional motives, such as the desire for efficient decision-
making or blame shifting. This would lead us to expect that delegation to regulatory agencies 
will be lower, and ex ante controls to be higher, as political principals seek to retain the power 
to steer policy over time (Pollack 2002).  
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Furthermore, determining the institutional location of new prudential policy tools is also 
problematic. Combining monetary policy, macroprudential regulation and microprudential 
supervision in a single institution certainly brings benefits in terms of coordination. But it can 
also generate multiple conflicts of interest, such as the risk of moral hazard arising from bank 
supervisors having discretionary power to manage liquidity (Eijffinger and Masciandaro 2011). 
In short, delegation theory by itself does not provide a clear guide as to the optimal institutional 
design of prudential policy making. 
 
Traditional functional accounts have two wider limitations which make them less useful for 
explaining patterns of post-crisis reform. First, delegation theories treat functional pressures as 
generated exogenously by the wider economic or political system (Adolph 2015: 6). Yet 
this presents a relatively static picture which tells us little about the dynamic and endogenous 
character of principal-agent relationships. Delegation is not simply a technocratic process, but 
a choice that is driven by a broader set of political objectives (Way 2000: 197). For example, 
studies suggest that the delegation of monetary policy can be an effective way of reconciling 
heterogeneous policy preferences and managing intra-party conflicts (Bernhard 1998; 
Bernhard and Leblang 2002; Gilardi 2007). Electoral incentives can also explain why left-wing 
parties may advocate central bank independence to signal their economic competence 
(Cukierman 1998; King 2005; Westrup 2007) or to strengthen their domestic policy autonomy 
(Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2013). Applying these ideas to post-crisis reforms, Lombardi and 
Moschella (2017) argue that the creation of new macroprudential authorities was driven by a 
‘logic of symbolic politics’, designed to signal to the public that action was being taken. 
 
Second, functional explanations tell us surprisingly little about the preferences and motives of 
regulatory agents, or how they may contest and (re-)shape delegation to suit their own 
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bureaucratic interests (Carpenter 2001; Huber and Shipan 2002; Krause and Meier 2003). This 
form of agency loss concerns institutional choices about the design of delegation itself, not 
about the particular policy ends that delegation serves. Kapstein (1992: 266-67) argues that 
central banks are ‘a group of bureaucrats...attempting to serve several conflicting public and 
private sector interests in an effort to maintain if not enhance their positional power’. Several 
studies show that central banks actively seek to shape the wider political and policy 
environment by exploiting their unique informational advantages, and cultivating expertise 
through wider regulatory networks (Brehm and Gates 1999; Masciandaro 2012; Adolph 2013). 
For example, Fernandez-Albertos (2015: 228) argues that many central banks deliberately 
advocated narrow policy mandates prior to the financial crisis so as to avoid having to make 
contentious policy trade-offs and thus minimise the risk of political interference. 
 
A richer understanding of post-crisis reform must therefore account for wider political and 
bureaucratic motives for institutional change. Although functional explanations provide a 
powerful explanation of delegation based on the need to make credible commitments, the 
theory is far less well-developed with respect to the use of delegation for other reasons, notably 
blame shifting. Addressing this is essential in order to explain why the decision to grant new 
prudential powers to central banks has often been highly contentious and contested, resulting 
in institutional designs which appear suboptimal. To this end, we draw on broader theories of 
blame avoidance. 
 
The politics of blame avoidance 
 
Blame avoidance is a form of risk management that aims to minimise the attribution of 
responsibility for perceived avoidable harm or loss (Hood 2002; Hood 2011). It assumes that 
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public officials, including both elected officials and unelected bureaucrats, exhibit strong 
negativity bias; that is, greater value is attached to avoiding potential losses than to attracting 
equivalent gains. Blame avoidance can be both reactive, by responding to current events in an 
effort to deflect blame and minimise damage to reputation, or anticipatory, which involves 
taking action to reduce the risk of attracting blame in the future (Hood 2011: 7). One of the 
most important strategies for blame avoidance is delegation. Principals can deflect 
responsibility by delegating decision making or policy implementation to quasi-independent 
agencies. In the event of policy failure, for instance, principals can shift the blame onto agencies 
and sidestep their own share of responsibility for past policy choices. 
 
Theories of blame avoidance provide a richer account of delegation by explaining 
organisational designs that appear suboptimal (Hood 2011: 69). Functionalist accounts assume 
that decisions about delegation constitute a simple binary choice between retaining control or 
devolving responsibility. From a blame avoidance perspective, however, the nature of 
delegation can be highly uncertain and shrouded in ambiguity. This creates opportunities for 
principals to limit blame through the creative allocation of formal responsibility, competency, 
or jurisdiction amongst different organisational units. It therefore posits a more fine-grained 
spectrum from hard delegation at one end to soft and fuzzy delegation at the other (Hood 2011: 
78). Soft delegation refers to a situation in which policy responsibilities are transferred to an 
autonomous agency, but the principal retains important levers of ex ante control or informal 
influence behind the scenes. For example, the principal may retain the capacity to reconfigure 
the mandate or composition of subservient agencies. In the case of fuzzy delegation, lines of 
responsibility may be deliberately blurred by creating disconnections amongst organisational 
units and from past structures (Hood 2011: 69). In this instance, the precise division of labour 
between principal and agent may be unclear or fluid. These weaker forms of delegation can 
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serve as an important strategy of blame shifting, enabling principals to simultaneously deflect 
responsibility for policy failures while claiming credit for policy successes. 
 
Theories of blame avoidance are also better placed to explain the contestability and 
changeability of delegation in several respects. First, delegation serves a wider symbolic 
purpose for principals that can generate conflict over institutional design. For instance, if 
particular agencies are closely associated with a political party in government, then opposition 
parties can assign blame for policy failure on both the agencies concerned and – by implication 
– the political principals that created them. In this sense, delegation not only provides the 
opportunity to deflect blame, but also to attribute blame to political opponents (see Sobol 
2016). Furthermore, delegation provides an opportunity for principals to recast policy failure 
as institutional failure. In doing so, public officials can present themselves in a positive light 
by undertaking institutional reform, either by abolishing existing agencies or creating new 
ones, to demonstrate that they are in control of events (Carpenter 2001). In this way, agency 
reconfiguration not only serves as an instrument of blame avoidance, but can actually be 
reputation enhancing as it allows principals to take the credit for seizing the initiative. 
 
Second, existing theories of blame avoidance say little about how agents respond to attempts 
to shift blame onto them. Yet the literature on bureaucratic reputation tells us that agencies are 
just as concerned with avoiding blame as principals (Carpenter and Krause 2012; Maor 2014; 
Gilad 2015). This is because reputation constitutes a valuable political resource which 
underpins an agency’s autonomy. Avoiding blame and building a positive reputation enables 
bureaucracies to generate public support, gain greater responsibilities and powers, and protects 
them from political interference (Carpenter 2002: 491). This generates expectations about how 
agents respond to the delegation of new powers. Bureaucrats will push for full autonomy and 
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hard delegation over powers that are potentially reputation enhancing, such as those that bestow 
high status, prestige or influence (Dunleavy 1991; Marsh et al. 2000; Gains and John 2010). 
Conversely, bureaucrats will try to limit their involvement in responsibilities which are likely 
to attract blame and thus potentially reputationally damaging, often by ‘hiving off’ these tasks 
to external organisations (Maor 2010, 2014). From a blame avoidance perspective, attempts by 
agents to reshape the scope and terms of delegation to limit blame and protect their reputation 
constitutes a special form of agency shirking: we label this agency subversion. 
 
Finally, the theory also points to the limits of using delegation as a strategy of blame avoidance. 
Delegation is more likely to shield organisations from blame for policy failures where these 
are relatively self-contained and/or time limited (Hood 2012: 74-6). But if policy failures are 
likely to generate wider economic contagion, heightened political salience or prolonged 
negative publicity, organisations may be vulnerable to blame ‘feedback’. In this situation, 
principals and/or agents may simply be unable to avoid becoming the target of mounting public 
anger for policy failure, regardless of formal lines of responsibility. In a context in which blame 
is likely to be attributed collectively, organisations have little incentive to try to avoid blame. 
Instead, the more prudent long-term strategy for managing reputational risk will be to maximise 
direct control and autonomy over key policy decisions. 
 
Blame avoidance provides a theoretical basis for inferring the preferences and strategies of 
governments and regulators (our independent variables). These are used to explain the 
institutional design of central bank reform in the UK (the dependent variable). Process tracing 
is used to map and explain the sequence of events and key decisions leading to institutional 
change. An overview of the preferences of the two main political parties and the Bank of 
England is provided in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Overview of organisational preferences, and the final outcome, on post-crisis reform 
 
 
Labour party 
position 
Conservative 
party position 
Bank of 
England 
position 
Outcome 
Location of 
macroprudential 
powers  
Financial Services 
Authority 
Bank of England Bank of England Bank of England 
Structures for 
macroprudential 
policy making 
Council for 
Financial Stability 
(Chair: Chancellor) 
Financial Policy 
Committee (Chair: 
Chancellor) 
Financial Policy 
Committee (Chair: 
Governor) 
Financial Policy 
Committee 
(Chair: Governor) 
Location of 
microprudential 
supervision 
Financial Services 
Authority 
Bank (core division) 
Separate or 
subordinate agency 
Bank (PRA 
subsidiary) 
 
 
 
The following section examines the preferences of the main political parties in the run up to 
the 2010 general election to understand their motives for central bank reform. We then turn our 
attention to explaining the precise terms of delegation as negotiated by the new Coalition 
Government (the principal) and the Bank of England (the agent). The final section concludes. 
 
Blame avoidance and agency reconfiguration 
 
The UK’s preferences on banking regulation underwent a dramatic shift during 2007-2010, 
rooted in the government’s experience of the financial crisis. Historically the UK had been a 
cheerleader for ‘light touch’ financial regulation (Quaglia 2008; Mügge 2011). But the fiscal 
burden of bailing out two of the UK’s largest banks sent shockwaves through the political 
establishment. There was broad cross-party consensus that the existing banking regulatory 
system was fundamentally broken. In the blame game that followed, much of the immediate 
anger for the failures of supervision were directed at the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
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(Treasury Committee 2009). But the Bank of England also became the target of mounting 
criticism for its failure to take wider responsibility for the health of the banking system: 
 
‘There was a lot of criticism about the Bank of England’s withdrawal from its leadership 
role in the City…Mervyn was very hostile to that. He was determined that the new Bank 
[after 1997] should not be seen to have a special interest in the health of the banks…There 
were definitely worries in the Treasury that the tripartite system wasn’t working as smoothly 
as it should…because of attitude of the Governor.’2 
 
Officials and industry leaders acknowledged the central bank’s share of the responsibility, 
arguing that it had ‘fumbled’ the management of the bank failures because it ‘couldn’t decide 
what to do’.3 But there was also puzzlement that, with hindsight, it had avoided much of the 
blame: 
 
‘Politically, this had been a disaster…The Treasury wanted the Bank to play a more forward 
role in managing the [Northern Rock] situation, but the Bank refused to do that…[They] 
thought that we were endangering UK financial markets and that we were not doing our job. 
But Mervyn was determined and we sort of limped through…It’s a bit of a miracle the Bank 
kept its credibility, but it did…It was the politicians who took the blame, and central banks 
emerged largely untouched.’4 
 
To explain how the Bank emerged with its reputation largely intact, it is necessary to analyse 
how political principals responded to the banking crisis by deflecting blame down to regulatory 
agencies. 
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The incumbent Labour government’s instinctive response was to defend the tripartite system it 
had created in 1997. It sought to deflect blame away from the FSA and kill off any attempt to 
have its powers reduced or for it to be scrapped altogether. The Chancellor, Alistair Darling, 
asked the new Chair of the FSA, Lord Turner, to undertake a review of the UK’s regulatory 
framework (Turner 2009). The review recommended that financial regulators be granted 
enhanced macroprudential powers which should be managed collaboratively by both the Bank 
and the FSA. In response, the Labour government proposed that the existing tripartite system 
should be strengthened with the creation of a new Council for Financial Stability, chaired by 
the Chancellor. This would constitute a powerful ex ante control mechanism through which the 
government would steer macroprudential policy making. Moreover, it rushed through 
legislation giving the FSA an explicit financial stability objective and a range of new 
macroprudential regulatory powers (HM Government 2010b).  
 
By contrast, the Conservative opposition called for the abolition of the FSA and for the bulk of 
its regulatory and supervisory powers to be transferred to the Bank of England. They blamed 
the FSA for the regulatory mistakes which contributed to the crisis, arguing that empowering 
the Bank would lead to more efficient decision-making as it would be less prone to industry 
capture (Conservative Party 2009: 19-20). But from the perspective of senior officials, this was 
viewed as an attempt to recast the banking crisis as institutional failure to deflect criticism of 
their own pre-crisis role: 
 
‘The Tories couldn’t credibly say we had been too light-touch on regulation, because they 
had argued that we over-regulated the City. So they quite quickly and intelligently launched 
on the idea that we had gotten the structure of regulation wrong…As a government we 
resisted the debate over regulatory structure as long as possible.’5 
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The Conservatives’ position was described as ‘intellectually lazy’ as it was not based on serious 
‘academic analysis’; instead, it was interpreted as ‘motivated by the politics of blame’, enabling 
them to apportion culpability for the crisis on the incumbent Labour government:6 
 
‘The Tory party wanted to pin this on Gordon Brown…If you’re George Osborne you need 
to have a snappy answer to why won’t it happen again, and who is to blame…It was a 
political attack.’7 
 
In accordance with the theory, agency reconfiguration was used as a strategy of blame 
avoidance at the height of the banking crisis. Key elected officials sought to recast the crisis as 
an institutional failure in order to deflect responsibility for their own pre-crisis policy choices. 
Moreover, the two main parties sought to deflect blame onto their political opponents. This led 
them to hold diametrically opposed views about which institutions were at fault, and thus to 
put forward competing proposals for reform. 
 
The Bank of England’s ability to avoid blame rested in large part on the outcome of a wider 
political contest for power. Nonetheless, in the run up to the 2010 General Election, it was 
proactive in seeking to deflect blame for the crisis and to defend its own reputation. Its initial 
response to the possibility of institutional reform highlighted its deep-rooted risk aversion. 
During 2007 and early 2008, the Bank’s overriding priority was to protect its narrow monetary 
policy mandate and credibility on price stability. The Governor in particular was ‘nervous’ 
about plans to expand its prudential regulatory role:8 
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‘Mervyn was less keen, because he saw the danger of this getting us back into being infected 
by the shenanigans in the financial sector, and he wanted us to be a monetary policy body 
above all else…There was a group of people within the Bank, including several of the 
external MPC members, that thought it was a government function not a Bank function.’9 
 
Yet from late 2008 onwards, the Bank underwent a sudden change of heart. We argue that the 
politics of blame avoidance are key to understanding this preference shift. As the banking crisis 
worsened, the Bank came to recognise the limits of delegation as a strategy for avoiding future 
reputational damage. In particular, the Governor was persuaded that the central bank could no 
longer be shielded from criticism of the banking system: 
 
‘Ultimately, if we are on the hook then we take some of the reputational hit from things 
going sour. Then the worst position to be in is responsibility without power…This was not 
about we must have power, we must have responsibility. In some ways, we came at it from 
the opposite angle. The conclusion was that we need some protection.’10 
 
‘Around the time of Northern Rock, [King] suddenly realised that his face was on quite a 
lot of this stuff anyway. He’d made a big misjudgement…What you then try to do is to make 
sure that you are in control of a number of levers but also try and de-risk the job.’11 
 
An added incentive was provided by inter-agency rivalry. The Labour government’s decision 
to legislate to grant the FSA new macroprudential responsibilities was viewed as a direct threat 
to the status of the Bank.12 In response, senior Bank officials began to lobby against the 
government’s plans: ‘[King] didn’t want anyone else doing macroprudential. The Bank was 
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pushing for that.’13 To defend its reputation, it also engaged in blame avoidance by deflecting 
responsibility for the banking crisis: 
 
‘It’s not as if we had been completely blind sided by the crisis in not having seen the build-
up of risks. We set them out as candidly and clearly as anyone before the crisis in the 
financial stability reports…People had taken not a blind bit of notice. So words by 
themselves clearly hadn’t done the trick, but words was all we had. All the regulatory tools 
were in the hands of the FSA…So nothing was done.’14 
 
‘[King] could see which way the election was going and tugged that way…There was a lot 
of self-justification going on. He gave a lot of speeches aimed at trying to guard his place in 
history by shifting blame onto politicians and others who wouldn’t let him do what he 
wanted to do.’15 
 
The Bank arguably ‘went further than it should’ in trying to shape the pre-election political 
agenda.16 For example, the Governor openly criticised Labour’s proposals in the 2009 Mansion 
House speech, complaining that it would be unable to discharge its statutory responsibility for 
maintaining financial stability if all it could do was ‘issue sermons and organise burials’ (King 
2009: 9). Furthermore, following the Conservatives’ strong performance in the 2009 European 
Parliament elections, senior Bank officials held several meetings with the Shadow Treasury 
team to discuss how the central bank’s role could be overhauled following the election.17 These 
talks fed into the publication of the Conservatives’ own proposals, based on the 
recommendations of a report published by Sir James Sassoon, which pledged to abolish the 
FSA and transfer most of its responsibilities to the Bank of England (Conservative Party 2009: 
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14-16). As a senior official confirmed, the Conservative’s ‘comprehensive plan’ for reform 
could not have been developed ‘without Bank of England involvement prior to the election.’18 
 
The Bank’s actions suggest that concerns about blame avoidance were paramount in shaping 
its position on agency reconfiguration. In particular, the Bank was determined to defend its 
reputation during the crisis by deflecting the blame onto others. But it also highlights the limits 
of using delegation as a strategy of blame avoidance. Given the risk that blame for future 
banking crises would be attributed to the central bank anyway, the Bank calculated that the 
best strategy to protect its reputation was to claim the new macroprudential powers for itself. 
Ultimately, these longer-term reputational concerns were sufficient to overcome its instinctive 
risk aversion to taking on an expanded policy mandate. 
 
 
Blame avoidance and agency subversion 
 
The UK general election which took place in May 2010 heralded a change of government, 
leading to the formation of a new Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition. The outcome did 
not initially augur well for the prospect of reform because the two parties had heterogeneous 
preferences on the structure of delegation. While the Conservatives had pledged to scrap the 
FSA and transfer its powers to the Bank, the Liberal Democrats had broadly supported the 
Labour government’s efforts to strengthen the existing tripartite system. 
 
A political deal was possible, however, because the junior coalition party’s main priority was 
securing a wider commitment to structural reform of the banking system; that is, the structural 
separation of retail and investment banking (Liberal Democrats 2010: 16-17). The Coalition 
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Agreement linked the issue of central bank reform and structural reform by making two 
commitments: first, reform of the tripartite supervisory system by abolishing the FSA and 
transferring most of its responsibilities to the Bank of England; and second, the establishment 
of an independent commission to investigate the viability of structural reform (HM 
Government 2010b: 9). This act of political expediency paved the way for the delegation of 
significant new powers to the central bank, the precise institutional design of which was 
negotiated by HM Treasury (as the principal) and the Bank of England (as agent) during 2010-
2011.19 The following section details the preferences of the two actors, and explains the 
outcome of the negotiations with respect to both macroprudential regulation and 
microprudential supervision.20 
 
1. Macroprudential regulation – hard delegation 
 
As the negotiations progressed, important differences emerged between the Treasury and Bank 
over the terms of delegation of new prudential powers. Although the central bank remained 
fully committed to the concept of macroprudential regulation, it harboured concerns about 
precisely what form this would take. Above all, it feared that the new powers could compromise 
its monetary policy credibility and operational independence if the government sought to retain 
the ability to steer macroprudential policy, which it might conceivably try to manipulate for 
electoral reasons. The Bank’s fears were confirmed when the government proposed the creation 
of a new Financial Policy Committee (FPC) to be chaired by the Chancellor. This was designed 
to rein in the power of the Governor, while ensuring that the Chancellor would have the final 
word on prudential matters: 
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‘If it were left to the Treasury, we would have left the process as it was and created a Council 
of Financial Stability with the Chancellor chairing it for greater accountability. Because it 
is always public money on the line.’21 
 
The Bank leadership viewed this as a direct reputational risk. In blame avoidance terms, the 
government’s proposal amounted to a form of ‘soft’ delegation which would create a powerful 
ex ante control mechanism over the central bank. In practice, this would allow the government 
to shift responsibility – and thus blame – for macroprudential regulation onto the Bank, whilst 
retaining the power to determine the policy objectives. Recognising that the Bank could no 
longer insulate itself from blame for future banking crises, it was determined to maximise its 
control over macroprudential policy making. It therefore proposed the ‘hard’ delegation of 
macroprudential powers based on ex post accountability; this meant that the new FPC should 
be modelled explicitly on the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), with the Bank Governor as 
Chair. 
 
To make its case, the Bank appealed to functionalist arguments about credibility. It suggested 
that only central banks had the necessary expertise to use macroprudential policy tools 
responsibly, and warned against the tendency of elected politicians and other ‘non-experts’ to 
interfere (Treasury Committee 2011: 126). From the government’s perspective, the Bank’s 
most important source of power was its ability to signal that its political independence had been 
compromised: 
 
‘If Mervyn suddenly started saying this is no longer an independent central bank, the 
Treasury are now telling me what to do, then that would have been very bad for the markets. 
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So the Bank had an ace to play, and everyone knew that. There was a limit to how much we 
could push him.’22 
 
Ultimately, the new and relatively inexperienced Chancellor did not have the stomach for a 
public battle with the long-serving Governor: 
 
‘Overall, the Bank got the framework it wanted more often than not. There was a strange 
relationship between Osborne and King. Osborne did not want to risk an argument with the 
Bank of England. So whenever the Bank really wanted something in the negotiation, it 
would escalate it to Governor – Chancellor level and get its way.’23 
 
The Bank was able to shift the terms of delegation decisively in its favour. The final design of 
the FPC therefore emulates the MPC with minimal ex ante controls. Additional safeguards 
were also put in place to ensure that the demands of financial stability would not interfere with 
the operation of monetary policy.24 
 
‘We did have a model, it was called the MPC model, and it was trialled and tested and 
trusted…We provided advice on them, so it’s no surprise that the FPC and the PRA board 
are very roughly modelled on the MPC…At root it’s the same model: ex ante mandate, ex 
post accountability.’25 
 
The institutional design established for macroprudential regulation owes a great deal to the 
politics of blame avoidance. The government was keen to limit delegation to the central bank 
by retaining important ex ante control mechanisms. In theory, this soft delegation would 
potentially allow it to shift blame to the Bank for policy failures, but to take credit for policy 
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successes. Recognising this, the central bank engaged in a strategy of agency subversion by 
using its full bureaucratic leverage to reshape the government’s plans. This enabled it to secure 
a harder form of delegation which maximised its control over new policy tools and offered 
greater protection of its reputation. 
 
2. Microprudential supervision – fuzzy delegation 
 
At the level of microprudential supervision, the Coalition upheld the main recommendations 
of the Sassoon Report. It was critical of the Bank’s narrow mandate, arguing that control of 
interest rates should be closely coordinated with the supervision of individual bank balance 
sheets to strengthen regulators’ capacity to respond flexibly to crises (Conservative Party 
2009). Centralising monetary, macroprudential and microprudential functions would 
concentrate market and institutional insight into one authority and create a single point of 
accountability. The government therefore proposed that the FSA should be abolished and 
responsibility for supervising individual firms transferred to a new Financial Regulation 
Division in the Bank (Conservative Party 2009). As a result, microprudential supervision 
would become a core function of the central bank, fully integrated into its central governance 
structures and with direct responsibility transferred to the Governor. The FSA’s remaining 
function, for conduct regulation, would be housed in a separate agency. 
 
The Bank of England had serious reservations about the reputational risk involved in managing 
day-to-day supervision. First, it was concerned that conflicts of interest could damage the 
credibility of the Bank’s monetary and macroprudential role. In particular, it feared coming 
under external pressure from government and industry to use its new discretionary powers on 
capital to help struggling institutions. Second, it recognised that firm-level supervision is highly 
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imperfect and prone to mistakes. The Bank had been scarred by the collapse of Barings and 
BCCI in the early 1990s, and was acutely aware that supervisors would ultimately be blamed 
for industry scandals, poor standards and bank failures. These concerns were articulated by 
both senior Bank and Treasury officials: 
 
‘There was considerable nervousness about assuming further regulatory responsibility. To 
argue that we were desperately keen to get back what we had lost in 1997/98 is just not true. 
You can either lose or draw, but you can never win – and we were acutely aware of that. 
That was the rationale for moving across prudential regulation [to the FSA] in the first 
place…[Supervision] could be anywhere. There’s no intrinsic reason it has to be us.’26 
 
‘The Bank always felt that the monetary policy element should avoid reputational damage 
that comes with supervision. They were not happy about the micro-economic supervision 
they inherited…[King] developed very strong views on the micro-prudential side. He 
definitely wanted the power on intervention, but none of the responsibility for it. The Bank 
wanted to be able to direct supervisors, but not supervise...They didn’t want anything to do 
with it. They don’t understand it and pushed back very hard.’27 
 
The Bank was determined to insulate itself against future reputational damage. Its ‘Plan A’ was 
to take the lead for macroprudential policy, ‘but not necessarily to take over the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority – i.e. the actual supervision of major financial institutions’.28 However, 
it also recognised that the government had a powerful political mandate for reform and that the 
abolition of the FSA was a fait accompli (Conaghan 2012: 254). Rather than resist the changes, 
the Bank’s leadership therefore pursued agency subversion aimed at remoulding the terms of 
delegation into something it could live with. Its Plan B was to keep microprudential issues as 
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far away from the core of the Bank as possible; ideally, the supervision of firms should be 
conducted by a separate entity, but one which the central bank would have the power to direct 
on the basis of its financial stability mandate. 
 
The Bank proved highly effective at reshaping the Coalition’s plans. As a Bank official argued, 
‘We were influential in that we got our analytical arguments straight early on and set them out 
very clearly. So in terms of the overall architecture of the Bill we had an important shaping 
role to play.’29 This was confirmed by a Treasury official: ‘The Bank was heavily involved in 
the details of the Financial Services Bill. Anything that it felt undermined its independence it 
lobbied very hard on.’30 The institutional design which emerged created two new bodies: the 
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), responsible for the prudential regulation and 
supervision of financial institutions; and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), which 
regulates financial products and consumer services. This structure differs from that originally 
envisaged in three key respects. 
 
First, the Bank successfully resisted the government’s plans to centralise supervision ‘over 
concerns that it could not be independent if it became part of the core Bank’.31 Instead, it was 
agreed that these functions would be housed in a separate subsidiary – the PRA – with its own 
legal personality and governance structure. This ensured that the new body would have full 
operational independence for day-to-day supervision and responsibility for firm-specific 
decisions (HM Treasury 2010: 29). From the Bank’s perspective, this structure was essential 
in order to create a firewall around its core monetary and macroprudential activities. 
 
Second, over time the division of labour between the PRA and FCA has been deliberately 
blurred. Contrary to the government’s original intentions, firm-level supervision is effectively 
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split between the two agencies. Their formal role is deliberately ambiguous: while the PRA has 
prudential responsibility for ‘all deposit takers, insurers and significant investment firms’, the 
FCA provides prudential supervision for any institutions ‘not regulated by the PRA’ (Bank of 
England 2013: 1). In practice, this has enabled the central bank to limit its direct involvement 
in supervision by ‘cherry picking’ the largest banks to oversee, while making clear that it had 
‘absolutely no interest’ in regulating any others.32 As a result, the PRA directly supervises only 
those firms that pose a potential macroprudential risk, while supervision of the majority of 
firms is delegated to the FCA, making it the largest prudential supervisor in Europe (FCA 
2016). 
 
Finally, the Bank also sought to enshrine the subordinate status of the two supervisory agencies 
by designing important ex ante control mechanisms. Hence both the PRA and FCA are required 
to comply with the Bank’s broad recommendations on financial stability or publish a 
justification of why they disagree (Bank of England 2013). King also requested a range of 
‘backstop veto powers’ over the PRA and FCA to ensure that their decisions would not conflict 
with the Bank’s new macroprudential objectives (Treasury Committee 2012: 29). 
 
From the government’s perspective, what emerged was far from ideal because it has created a 
more complicated structure, and marks less of a symbolic break with the past, than the 
Chancellor had intended: 
 
‘[King] was interested in having a split role, and you can see that in the design of the Bank 
post-reform. There are too many committees – an MPC, FPC and PRA – all of which he 
chairs. Where the hell did that come from?...We’ve still got three organisations and they all 
need to cooperate. But the presentation of being able to abolish a body is much more 
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powerful than just creating another coordinating committee…From Osborne’s point of 
view, to say we are creating a new committee is much less clear cut than saying we are 
abolishing Brown’s FSA and putting it back in the Bank…There is now the FCA, but which 
is in the old FSA building and is staffed with FSA employees. The people don’t get 
abolished, and nor do the offices.’33 
 
In important respects, the new structures contradicted the government’s own logic for 
scrapping the FSA. For example, locating microprudential supervision in an operational 
subsidiary makes coordination with the Bank more difficult to achieve by generating new 
sources of conflict: 
 
‘You knew that the FSA was the single regulatory body…so there was clarity about it. What 
you have now is, with the FCA and PRA, two regulators that are working to a slightly 
different agenda that actually conflicts.’34 
 
In addition, the blurred division of labour between the PRA and FCA leaves sectors like 
insurance ‘stuck slightly uneasily’ between different institutions, while the FCA’s supervisory 
role contradicts the original objective of separating supervision from conduct regulation.35 
 
The Bank’s actions with respect to microprudential issues reflect a concern, above all else, to 
protect itself from future reputational damage. In response to having supervisory powers foisted 
upon it, the central bank used ‘fuzzy’ delegation to blur responsibility by shifting day-to-day 
oversight of individual firms down to separate and subordinate agencies. This enabled the Bank 
to insulate its core monetary and macroprudential functions by potentially deflecting blame for 
future supervisory failures. Yet this has produced an institutional design that is suboptimal in 
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several important respects. We argue that this points to blame avoidance, rather than efficiency 
gains, as being the main driver of the reform process.36 
 
Conclusion 
 
The ambition of this paper was to explain the strengthening of the UK central bank with new 
prudential powers. The main puzzle was that the institutional design which eventually emerged 
not only diverged significantly from the government’s original plans, but that it was also 
suboptimal in several important respects. We argue that the reforms cannot be explained on the 
basis of credible commitments or decision-making efficiency. Instead, we argue that the 
changes owe far more to the politics of blame avoidance and managing reputational risk. 
Theories of blame avoidance provide empirical expectations about the behaviour of principals 
and agents in a context of policy failure. This enables us to refine existing ideational and 
functional explanations, and to provide a richer account of the contested and contingent 
character of post-crisis reform. The article makes two main claims. 
 
First, political principals used agency reconfiguration as a strategy of blame avoidance at the 
height of the banking crisis. Key elected officials sought to recast the crisis as an institutional 
failure in order to deflect responsibility for their own pre-crisis policy choices. Moreover, the 
two main parties sought to deflect blame onto their political opponents. This led them to hold 
diametrically opposed views about which institutions were at fault, and thus to put forward 
competing proposals for reform. Second, bureaucratic agents used agency subversion to protect 
or defend their reputation. This involved reshaping the terms of delegation in such a way as to 
deflect or manage blame for future policy failure.  
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Importantly, our analysis highlighted both the importance and limits of delegation as a strategy 
of blame avoidance. With respect to microprudential supervision, the Bank of England was 
instinctively risk averse about taking on direct responsibility for individual firm-level 
oversight. In response, it calculated that blame for future bank failures could be minimised by 
blurring responsibility through fuzzy delegation. To protect its core monetary and 
macroprudential functions, it therefore sought to shift responsibility for day-to-day supervision 
down to separate and subordinate agencies. With respect to macroprudential regulation, the 
Bank was similarly hesitant about the prospect of an expanded policy mandate. By contrast, 
however, it also recognised that it ultimately could not avoid future blame for failures in the 
banking system. As a result, the Bank calculated that the most prudent strategy to minimise 
long-term reputational risk was to push for full control over new macroprudential tools. It 
therefore sought to resist government efforts to impose a form of soft delegation, and instead 
lobbied successfully for a hard delegation model of macroprudential policy-making that 
maximised its own control and policy discretion. 
 
The article contributes to the broader political economy literature on central banks in two ways. 
First, the concept of agency subversion as a strategy of blame avoidance sheds new light on 
the influence of central banks within government. In particular, our analysis highlights three 
sources of bureaucratic power which regulatory agencies can potentially wield over political 
principals: the ability to signal to the market that their political independence, and thus 
credibility, has been compromised (we label this ‘market power’); the capacity to engage in 
private lobbying and make public pronouncements to pressure ministers (‘instrumental 
power’); and the ability to exploit institutional permanence, and the status and experience of 
senior officials, over newly-elected political principals (‘political power’). In the case of the 
UK, the Bank of England was able to leverage these bureaucratic powers to reshape delegation 
29 
 
such that the final outcome was significantly at odds with the original intention of the newly-
elected government. 
 
Second, the study highlights the need for a broader interpretation of functional motives in 
theorising central bank reform. Although blame shifting has been identified as a potential driver 
of delegation (Pollack 2002), most functionalist accounts tend to assume ‘rational’ motives 
based on credible commitments or decision-making efficiency. Yet there is a disconnection 
with those empirical studies which show that central bank reform often leads to counter-
intuitive, or even dysfunctional, outcomes. These are instead typically attributed to partisan or 
political incentives (for example, Bernhard 1998; Bernhard and Leblang 2002; Gilardi 2007). 
We argue that theories of blame avoidance are well placed to bridge this gap. By inferring that 
principals and agents are also concerned with reputation, we can explain how functional 
motives may, paradoxically, lead to suboptimal institutional outcomes. In the UK case, this can 
even include forms of delegation which are potentially detrimental to both credibility (as in the 
case of the government’s original design for the Financial Policy Committee) or efficiency (for 
example, the coordination problems between the PRA and FCA). The blame avoidance 
approach we develop here is therefore intended as a guide to future comparative research which 
can potentially provide a better understanding of variation in post-crisis reform. 
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1 The ECB distinguishes between three main supervisory models: (i) sectoral model: each sector (banking, 
securities and insurance) is supervised by one authority; (ii) ‘twin peaks’ model: responsibilities are allocated on 
the basis of the supervisory objectives, with prudential supervision and conduct of business regulation attributed 
to two different authorities; and (iii) single authority model: all the supervisory functions are allocated to a 
single authority, which covers both prudential supervision and investor protection (ECB 2010). 
2 Interview with former senior Bank of England official (January 2015). 
3 Interview with financial industry lobbyist, UK bank (December 2014). 
4 Interview with former senior Bank of England official (January 2015). 
5 Interview with former No.10 senior official (November 2014). 
6 Interview with HM Treasury official (January 2015) and former HM Treasury Special Advisor (November 
2015). 
7 Interview with former senior Bank of England official (January 2015). 
8 Interview with senior Bank of England official (November 2013). 
9 Interview with former senior Bank of England official (January 2015). 
10 Interview with senior Bank of England official (November 2013). 
11 Interview with former Bank of England official / financial industry executive (December 2013). 
12 Interview with former No.10 senior official (November 2014). Puzzlingly, the FSA Chairman, Adair Turner, 
remained relatively open-minded about their location. Our interviews suggest that this was because ‘he might 
have had half a chance’ at being given a senior role in the Bank in the near future. Moreover, in the run up to the 
election, the FSA received assurances that the changes would not necessarily be implemented: ‘They were given 
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a strong indication…that the [Conservatives] wouldn’t go ahead with [the Sassoon Report]…It came as a bit of 
a shock to them when the new government decided it was going to go ahead.’ (Interview with senior HM 
Treasury official, November 2014). 
13 Interview with former senior Bank of England official (January 2015). 
14 Interview with senior Bank of England official (November 2013). 
15 Interview with former No.10 senior official (November 2014). 
16 Interview with former No.10 senior official (November 2014). 
17 Interview with senior HM Treasury official (June 2015). See also Conaghan (2012: 239-41). 
18 Interview with former HM Treasury Special Advisor (November 2015). 
19 The Treasury-Bank negotiations were overseen by a committee composed of the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(George Osborne), the Treasury Permanent Secretary (Nick Macpherson) and Second Permanent Secretary 
(Tom Scholar), the Bank Governor (Mervyn King) and Deputy Governor (Paul Tucker), the FSA Chairman 
(Adair Turner) and Chief Executive (Hector Sants), which met every few months. The day-to-day negotiations 
were handled by a working group of senior officials. (Interview with senior HM Treasury official, November 
2014). 
20 We find no evidence that the financial industry had strongly-held preferences on central bank reform. There 
was little lobbying against the proposed changes, not least because many banks were quietly supportive: ‘The 
City banks always preferred dealing with the Bank as opposed to the FSA. They wanted a powerful Bank who 
speaks for them. Now though you have a powerful Bank that also kicks them about. But nonetheless I think they 
favoured this move’ (Interview with former senior Bank of England official, January 2015). From industry’s 
perspective, how the new powers would be used was a more pressing concern than where they were to be 
located: ‘I think most banks realised that regulation was going to get tightened, irrespective of the structure. So I 
don’t remember them being massively unhappy with this’ (Interview with former No.10 senior official, 
November 2014). 
21 Interview with senior HM Treasury official (June 2015). 
22 Interview with former No.10 senior official (November 2014). 
23 Interview with senior HM Treasury official (June 2015). 
24 For example, it was stipulated that the FPC should receive all its briefings from the MPC, ensuring that its 
decisions are made on the basis of information received from the latter (Interview with member of the Financial 
Policy Committee, April 2016). 
25 Interview with senior Bank of England official (November 2013). 
26 Interview with senior Bank of England official (November 2013). 
27 Interview with senior HM Treasury official (June 2015). 
28 Interview with former senior Bank of England official (January 2015). 
29 Interview with senior Bank of England official (November 2013). 
30 Interview with HM Treasury official (January 2015). 
31 Interview with senior FSA/PRA official (November 2015). 
32 Interview with senior FSA/PRA official (November 2015). 
33 Interview with former senior Bank of England official (January 2015). 
34 Interview with financial industry lobbyist, UK bank (December 2014). 
35 Interview with former senior Bank of England official (January 2015). 
36 Further evidence for this comes from the fact that under Governor Mark Carney, these institutional structures 
have undergone further revision. In particular, the Bank of England Act (2016) abolishes the PRA’s status as a 
subsidiary with its own board. This is designed to streamline decision making, and strengthen governance and 
accountability, as part of Governor Mark Carney’s ‘One Bank’ strategy (Reuters 2015). The changes, coming 
just two years after the original reforms were agreed, points to the suboptimality of the institutional compromise 
insisted upon by King. Notably, however, the blurred division of labour between the PRA and FCA for 
microprudential supervision remains in place. 
